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Auckland Council 
is it too big to last?
Auckland is a city-region under intense political pressure. 
Migration and development are transforming streetscapes 
and communities. Local government has to plan and budget 
for significant investments in infrastructure as the city grows, 
and there is no strategy that pleases all sectors of residents 
at once. Property owners love their rising asset wealth, but 
central government is under pressure to address homelessness 
and home affordability. The Reserve Bank and the Treasury, 
moreover, watch Auckland’s over-heated housing market 
nervously, as it poses risk to the whole economy (Makhlouf, 
2016). 
simply Auckland Council, a middle term is 
conspicuous by its absence. ‘City’, ‘District’ 
and ‘Regional’ could not be used, as they 
were the kinds of entities being abolished. 
Auckland Provincial Council would have 
resurrected an entity abolished in the 19th 
century; ‘Shire’ sounds too Australian; 
State of Auckland would have raised the 
spectre of federalism.
Auckland’s basic problem is one that 
many other regions would love to have: 
growth. But then, how do you manage it? 
Its population was 1,415,550 in the 2013 
census, and is predicted conservatively 
to reach 2 million by 2033. ‘Three-
fifths of New Zealand’s population 
growth between 2013 and 2043 will be 
in Auckland’ (Statistics New Zealand, 
2015). Providing for this growth is costly 
for ratepayers (new infrastructure and 
amenities) and for central government 
(new schools, state highways, etc), and 
there is no end of argument over how to 
plan for it. A struggle arose over whether 
the urban space should intensify (grow 
up) or sprawl (grow out), and a political 
compromise was reached when the 
council passed the unitary plan in August 
2016.1
In the midst of this, a major restructuring 
of Auckland’s local governance and 
administration has been undertaken. 
The formation of the Auckland Council 
in 2010 unified four metropolitan city 
councils, two and a half district councils 
and one regional council, comprising 
a large urban, rural and marine area 
(encompassing 4,894 sq km of land and 
3,702 km of coastline and embracing 30% 
of New Zealand’s population). This new 
entity was popularly dubbed the Super 
City, somewhat misleadingly given that, in 
terms of area, the new authority is mainly 
rural, although its population is mainly 
urban-dwelling. Being formally named 
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Blakely (2015) summarised the 
planning issues in a previous issue of 
this journal; the present article considers 
the new governance structure of the 
Auckland Council itself, but not the 
council’s administrative organisation. 
Central government considered that 
a unified governance structure was 
needed in order to provide the policy 
and planning effectiveness necessary to 
manage the city’s growth. In the view 
of the Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance,2 the aim was to achieve 
strategically cohesive and effective 
planning and decision making across the 
region, and to improve local participation 
and engagement. Efficiency and cost 
reduction were not the primary concerns. 
Businesses and central government were 
frustrated with having to deal with 
seven local authorities; it was considered 
desirable that Auckland should ‘speak 
with one voice’ (Chen, 2014). The reforms 
were set down in the Local Government 
(Auckland Council) Act 2009, without 
the endorsement of a local referendum.
This significant reform of governance 
was more than just an amalgamation. 
It introduced a two-tier structural 
model with an office of the mayor that 
was new to local government in New 
Zealand at the time. Proposals for similar 
unifications in other regions (Northland, 
Wellington and Hawke’s Bay) were 
roundly rejected after consultation and, 
in the case of Hawke’s Bay, a referendum. 
And most Aucklanders’ attitudes are 
negative or indifferent towards the 
new local authority. The council’s own 
performance-monitoring survey found 
that few residents express trust in the 
council or satisfaction with its services. 
Only 15% expressed satisfaction with the 
council’s overall performance; 17% trust 
the council to make the right decisions; 
and 20% were confident that the council 
is heading in the right direction. Critics 
of the council are especially prevalent in 
the Rodney and Hibiscus and Bays areas 
(Auckland Council, 2016). Those in rural 
areas feel that the new administration 
has an urban bias (Rose, 2015). Local 
advocacy groups in North Rodney and 
Waiheke Island formally proposed the 
formation of separate unitary authorities 
to the Local Government Commission, 
arguing that Auckland Council does 
not represent or address the needs of 
their communities. So, how well have 
the Auckland reforms worked out 
in practice? Is the new model fit for 
purpose? As a decision-making entity (or 
group of entities), is it achieving what it 
was supposed to achieve? And, even if it 
is working well, what further problems 
or needs for modifications have become 
apparent?
The unification aimed for cohesive 
Auckland-wide planning within a single 
policy framework, and the new model 
has settled in surprisingly well, given the 
sheer size and scope of the restructuring 
and the lengthy and contentious process 
towards a unified plan. My qualified 
endorsement of the unified governance 
model should not be taken as an 
evaluation of the particular actions and 
decisions of the Auckland Council. The 
unitary governance model and the actual 
performance of the council itself are 
obviously closely related, but they need 
to be assessed separately. Dissatisfaction 
with rates rises and planning processes 
has emerged, but it is not sufficient 
simply to ‘blame the Super City’ for this, 
as one cannot prove that people would 
have been better off under the former 
seven councils. Although the Auckland 
model has some flaws, the challenge for 
the time being is to make it work as well 
as possible. The present article identifies 
aspects of the governance model that 
may require refinement. Looking long-
term, it also asks whether Auckland 
Council, in its present form, is simply 
too big to last.
The 2016 election, then, was the third 
time that Aucklanders have participated 
in this governance structure as electors. 
They vote at large for one mayor, vote 
for a councillor to represent their local 
ward on the council’s governing body 
(which has 20 councillors and the 
mayor), and select a team (of between 
five and nine members) to make up 
their local board. The 21 local boards 
play an important role in local policy 
decisions and place-shaping, but they 
are not mini-councils, as they have no 
powers to raise rates or to pass by-laws. 
They do have non-regulatory functions, 
and they have input into region-wide 
policy through their local strategic 
plans. It is the governing body that 
approves the budget, makes the critical 
policy and planning decisions and 
passes by-laws. The mayor has a ‘first 
mover’ role, initiating budget proposals 
and strategic plans, but has only one 
vote on the governing body. This 
briefly summarises the main elements 
of Auckland’s governance. Aspects of 
this new model of local government 
have become politically controversial, 
however; this article sets out some of 
those contentious issues and seeks to 
put them into context.
The governing body
The mayor of Auckland appoints the 
deputy mayor, chairs the governing body, 
establishes its committees and appoints 
their chairpersons. The inaugural 
mayor, Len Brown, distributed the roles 
of committee chairs evenly among 
councillors across the political spectrum. 
This helped to avoid partisanship of a 
kind that, at worst, could mean a stand-off 
in which a majority opposes the mayor. 
So, while there was a noticeable left–right 
political spectrum, no cohesive factions 
(and certainly no whipped caucuses) 
emerged under Brown’s mayoralty. 
Nonetheless, the mayor is given significant 
powers. Councillor Christine Fletcher 
observed that the inaugural mayor, the 
Dissatisfaction with rates rises and 
planning processes has emerged, but 
it is not sufficient simply to ‘blame the 
Super City’ for this ...
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deputy mayor and the chair of the finance 
committee had ‘much of the control and 
authority for day-to-day organisation and 
gatekeeping between the chief executive 
and senior management, and access to 
information’ (Fletcher, 2015).
The ward system for the election 
of councillors means that they are 
based geographically across the whole 
of Auckland. This creates a tension, 
however, between representing their local 
voters, on one hand, and the need to vote 
in the interests of the region as a whole 
on the other. 
Some governing body councillors 
think regionally … but a few are still 
very parochial and not all work well 
with their local boards, creating a 
situation whereby the governing body 
councillor and local board members 
cut across each other’s work. In 
theory, given their regional mandate, 
governing body councillors should be 
visiting and meeting with residents 
and local boards outside their own 
wards to get a more-regional view 
of issues, and this does happen with 
some councillors. (Shirley et al., 
2016, p.23)
Moreover, this body of 21 
representatives makes the key regulatory, 
budgetary and rating decisions for a 
population of 1.5 million and growing: a 
representation ratio of roughly 1:71,500. 
Given the scope of the unitary planning 
process, it is simply impossible for 
councillors to be ‘across the details’ in 
their own wards, let alone the region, 
and hence unelected officials are likely to 
exercise greater influence.
The office of the mayor
The legislation gives the mayor the leading 
(but not decisive) role in planning and 
budgeting, and authorises him or her to 
be the voice of Auckland as a whole. To 
support this higher executive function, it 
provides for an office of the mayor with 
a guaranteed operational budget. The 
mayor can staff this office as he or she sees 
fit, but all the employment agreements 
come under the human resources controls 
of the council’s chief executive. The office 
of mayor and its executive powers have 
nonetheless been attacked for giving the 
mayor too much power, independently 
of the governing body and removed 
from public scrutiny. Christine Fletcher 
commented in 2015 that democracy is 
‘lacking’, that ‘Councillors are not driving 
policy’, and that the public did not get 
enough information about decisions 
affecting them (Fletcher, 2015). To 
mitigate such concerns, the mayor’s role 
as first mover in policy development is 
subject to the support of the governing 
body, and budgeting and planning 
processes are open to the public once 
they reach the governing body. Having 
the mayor elected at large is appropriate 
to the purposes of the unitary governance 
model, as it means there is a single 
figurehead for the whole region. Given the 
scope and responsibilities of this new civic 
leadership role, it also appropriate that a 
distinct office be resourced to support it.
Representation and participation
Auckland Council has 21 local boards with 
between five and nine elected members 
each, or 149 members altogether. The 
population covered by any single local 
board is larger than many of the local 
territorial authorities elsewhere in New 
Zealand, but the boards have no regulatory 
powers. They cannot pass by-laws or levy 
rates; their budgets are granted by the 
governing body. The legislation states that 
the local boards and the governing body 
‘share’ decision making, but the governing 
body can override a local board if a local 
matter is deemed to have region-wide 
policy implications or impact. A formal 
submission seeking to split North Rodney 
off from Auckland Council stated that ‘we 
do not regard the present local boards 
as any more than advocates, as they have 
very limited areas of empowerment’ 
(Northern Action Group, 2013, p.15). 
This may underestimate the consultation, 
planning and place-shaping roles of 
local boards, but nonetheless it reflects a 
certain perception of the two-tier model. 
If one includes all of the elected officials 
on local boards and the governing body, 
the representation ratio in Auckland is 
still a relatively high 1:8,820 and growing. 
This indicates that a significant weakness 
in the Auckland model may be at this 
local level, in terms of representation 
and engagement. Local board members 
are part-time in their roles, and not all 
meetings are open to the public. The claim 
that they lack the resources and powers 
to be meaningfully working with, and 
making decisions for, their communities 
will continue to be heard.
Ma-ori representation
The government rejected the royal 
commission’s recommendation to 
have Mäori represented directly on the 
governing body through two wards, 
based on the Mäori electoral roll, plus 
one appointed by a Mana Whenua 
Forum. Instead, the legislation created an 
independent board tasked with assisting 
the council in ‘promoting cultural, 
economic, environmental, and social 
issues of significance’ for both mana 
whenua and mataawaka (urban Mäori), 
and ensuring that the council complies 
with statutory provisions that refer to 
the Treaty of Waitangi.3 The Independent 
Mäori Statutory Board consists of seven 
mana whenua and two mataawaka 
representatives. They are appointed by 
a selection body which includes one 
representative from each mana whenua 
group. The board then appoints up to 
Urban Ma-ori leaders complain that the 
views of their community groups are 
still not being taken into account, and 
they say that mataawaka representatives 
should be appointed by urban Ma-ori ...
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two of its members to sit on each sub-
committee of the governing body. 
Some have criticised this arrangement 
on the grounds that it places unelected 
members onto committees that are 
otherwise composed of elected councillors 
(Rudman, 2015). On the other hand, by 
representing each of seven mana whenua 
groups, this arrangement provides a 
more inclusive, yet independent, avenue 
for local Mäori participation in decision 
making than would have occurred under 
the royal commission’s proposal for only 
two wards. The boundaries of such wards 
would cut across and/or incorporate 
distinct rohe. But with no Mäori 
wards, there is no guaranteed Mäori 
representation on the governing body 
itself, only on its subordinate committees.
Moreover, the selection body’s 
appointments of mataawaka representa-
tives have been controversial. One 
unsuccessful applicant disputed the 
selection process, and the Court of Appeal 
(in Te Rangi v Jackson) agreed that the 
process had been hasty and failed to take 
into account the views of mataawaka. 
But the controversy has not ended there. 
Although the selection body consists 
only of mana whenua representatives, it 
appoints the mataawaka representatives. 
Urban Mäori leaders complain that the 
views of their community groups are 
still not being taken into account, and 
they say that mataawaka representatives 
should be appointed by urban Mäori 
(Radio New Zealand, 2016). That would 
require amending the statute.
Direct representation by indigenous 
people in governance over their 
traditional territories is consistent with 
the Treaty of Waitangi and necessary 
for heritage and development purposes; 
hence some form of guaranteed 
representation for Mäori – and not 
only through ‘mainstream’ systems – is 
warranted. Mäori wards could still be 
implemented in Auckland, but they are 
politically contentious (Edwards, 2016). 
The current independent board is a 
compromise that has caused controversy 
among Mäori and non-Mäori.
Financial situation
Some observers assume that the unitary 
model was set up with ‘alluring promises 
of a cheaper and more efficient council’ 
(Hill, 2015). No such promise was 
made, however. The royal commission 
and others (McKinlay Douglas Limited, 
2006; Reid, 2009) were aware that, while 
some efficiencies may be gained through 
combining services and resources, the 
overall costs may not be reduced due to 
past underinvestment in infrastructure 
and population growth. Empirical 
research from Australia suggests, 
moreover, that, beyond a certain scale, 
amalgamation of local authorities may 
even lead to diseconomies (see below).
An independent analysis of Auckland 
Council’s finances concluded that rates 
increases, on average, ‘are well above the 
rate of inflation, but allowance needs 
to be made for Auckland’s growth and 
the pressures this creates, as well as for 
addressing the infrastructure deficit’, and 
that ‘debt appears to be within prudent 
limits, although compared to other 
councils it is high and growing’ (Shirley 
et al., 2016, pp.40, 69). In June 2016 
the council group’s total tax-supported 
debt was reported to be at 246.5% of its 
adjusted operating revenue, and it aims 
to keep this under 270%. Auckland has 
large capital expenditure requirements 
to upgrade existing infrastructure, due 
to increased population densities and the 
need to modernise, and also has to provide 
new infrastructure as urban development 
expands. Hence some difficult decisions 
have to be made about financing this in 
future, through debt, rates, user charges, 
public–private partnerships and/or asset 
sales.
Council-controlled organisations (CCOs)
The CCO model has also been a 
controversial aspect of Auckland 
governance. Given the sheer size of the 
assets and costs, especially in Auckland 
Transport and Watercare, there have been 
claims that there should be more direct 
democratic accountability over them. 
The Ports of Auckland Ltd (a company 
wholly owned by a CCO) has been subject 
to public controversy, for example, due 
to its management of the workforce and 
a proposed wharf extension. The CCOs 
have their own governing boards and are 
required to act as commercial entities. This 
opens up the risk of role conflict and poor 
co-ordination between the business goals 
of a CCO, the wishes of a local community 
and the region-wide policies and planning 
priorities of the unitary plan. The 
Auckland model could thus be accused 
of replacing geographical fragmentation 
with functional fragmentation.
In the recent past, under the ‘new 
public management’ of the 1990s 
publicly-owned trading organisations 
such as state-owned enterprises and 
CCOs were required to act like business 
enterprises, although some social 
responsibilities may be mandated as 
well. Commercially-oriented business 
decisions were at arm’s length from the 
political process, and hence subject to 
less ‘interference’. A minister or a council 
might instead purchase services from 
them. For Auckland’s CCOs, however, the 
pendulum is now swinging back towards 
centralised control and democratic 
oversight. The Governance Manual 
for Substantive CCOs (issued by the 
Auckland Council’s CCO governance and 
monitoring committee in August 2015) 
requires them to act in the best interests 
of ‘the council group’ and to make 
decisions that align with the council’s 
plans and policies. Agency theory and 
the autonomy to act as a commercial 
entity have given way to ‘partnership’ and 
closer co-ordination of activities between 
council entities.
Too big to last? 
Experts largely agree that the unification 
was a good idea (Chen, 2014; Shirley et al., 
Experts largely agree that the unification 
was a good idea ... but very few 
residents hold positive opinions about 
the council ...
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2016), but very few residents hold positive 
opinions about the council (Auckland 
Council, 2016). Even some councillors 
are sceptical. Mike Lee (Waitematä and 
Gulf ward) expressed qualified support 
for a ‘greater level of self-government’ 
for North Rodney on the grounds that 
the unitary Auckland Council ‘cannot be 
defended as optimal in terms of efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness’ (Lee, 2016, p.26). 
The council has work to do to build the 
reputation of the unitary model among 
its own elected members and Aucklanders 
at large. Even if disaffected communities 
in North Rodney and Waiheke Island do 
not win their case to break away from 
Auckland Council, the fact that they have 
put formal proposals forward to do so 
shows that many residents see the council 
as too big and too remote for effective 
local democracy. If this trend were taken 
to its logical conclusion, however, more 
powers would be devolved to all local 
boards, and eventually Auckland would 
have 21 boroughs and a regional council, 
and be back at square one.
On the other hand, an argument in 
favour of the unitary council is based 
on its sheer size. It may create greater 
buying power with suppliers, reduce 
duplication, allow for efficient sharing of 
services, and provide scope for trialling 
innovative service models. Empirical 
evidence from Australia, if comparable, 
suggests that Auckland Council could be 
well above the optimal size, however. The 
forced amalgamations of local bodies 
in Queensland in 2007 reduced the 
number of councils from 157 to 73 and 
the number of elected representatives 
from 1,250 to 526. But a before-and-
after analysis ‘cast doubt on whether 
the Queensland forced amalgamation 
program has improved the operational 
efficiency of local councils’ (Drew, Kortt 
and Dollery, 2016, p.12). As a result of 
the amalgamations, this study found, 
a greater proportion of Queensland 
residents were represented by local 
authorities that exhibited diseconomies 
of scale. The optimal population size 
was found to be just under 100,000. In 
addition, Sinnewe, Kortt and Dollery 
(2016) conducted a comparison of the 
very large Brisbane City Council with 
Sydney City Council, an average of six 
south-east Queensland councils and an 
average of ten metropolitan New South 
Wales councils on measures of financial 
performance. If the notion that ‘bigger 
is better’ holds true, then Brisbane (with 
380,800 households) should out-perform 
those comparators. But, on measures 
of financial flexibility, liquidity and 
debt-servicing ability, the Brisbane City 
Council performed comparatively poorly. 
On non-financial performance indicators 
too the evidence does not look good for 
larger municipalities. Using data from 
community satisfaction surveys of local 
councils in the state of Victoria, Drew, 
Dollery and Kort found, for metropolitan 
councils, an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between population size and 
community satisfaction. These results 
suggest ‘an optimal population size for 
Victorian councils between 161000 and 
174000 residents’ (Drew, Dollery and 
Kortt, 2016, p.74).
Given that Auckland’s average rates 
increases have been well above inflation 
and that there is significant public 
dissatisfaction with the council, the results 
of this Australian research reinforce the 
contention that the Auckland model is 
well beyond the optimum size from the 
viewpoint of both efficiency and public 
satisfaction. Auckland is now the largest 
local authority in Australasia in terms 
of population, and the comparative 
evidence cited above does not support 
the notion that its size will lead to greater 
efficiency and economy of scale, or to 
greater public satisfaction.
Conclusion
Is Auckland Council now simply too big to 
be efficient, democratic and sustainable? 
Will it be branded ‘a failed experiment’? 
Once the unitary spatial plan has been 
approved and put in place, will the next 
step be to devolve powers to, say, ten or 12 
smaller councils?
Empirical evidence and public 
sentiment weigh against Auckland’s 
unified governance model. Aucklanders 
disapprove of it; the rest of New Zealand 
refuses to emulate it. This particular 
pendulum may have further to swing 
towards centralisation (meaning central 
government takes over some powers to 
shape Auckland), or it may have reached 
its extreme position and be on the cusp 
of swinging back towards a devolved 
model (multiple boroughs under a 
regional council). In the meantime, the 
council has to earn a better reputation 
with the people of Auckland, improve 
local engagement and participation, 
implement the new unitary plan and 
ensure financial sustainability. Its long-
term fate rests in the balance.
1 At the time of writing, legal appeals threaten to delay the full 
application of the unitary plan’s zoning maps.
2 The Report of the Royal Commission on Auckland 
Governance (2009) and related papers have been archived 
by the National Library at http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/
ArcAggregator/arcView/frameView/IE1055203/http://www.
royalcommission.govt.nz/.
3 Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009, s81.
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support the notion that its size will lead 
to greater efficiency and economy of 
scale ...
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Forthcoming Event in March 2017
Improving Intergenerational 
Governance
As part of the University’s 
focus on the theme 
of Advancing Better 
Government, the Institute 
for Governance and Policy 
Studies is organising a 
one-day symposium at 
Parliament in March 2017 on 
Improving Intergenerational 
Governance.
Speakers will include:  
Peter Hughes; State Services Commissioner; 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC,  
Professor Jonathan Boston,  
Dr Andrew Colman.  
Professor Girol Karacaoglu,  
Professor Wendy Larner,  
Associate Professor Michael Macaulay and 
Associate Professor Maryan Van Den Belt.
More information will 
be made available soon 
through  
www.igps.victoria.ac.nz
